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In 1989, the socialist regime in Romania collapsed and the state’s coercive pro-natalist 
policy ended. Since then, fertility has gone through major changes, namely, a massive 
reduction in fertility and important structural changes: birth postponement, an end to 
universal childbearing, and the emergence of non-marital births. Family formation has 
been postponed, but a pattern of early marriage still persists compared to other 
European countries. Although unmarried cohabitation is rising, it is rarely seen as an 
alternative to marriage. Modern contraceptive methods are being used increasingly, but 
traditional contraceptive methods continue to be widespread. Abortion, which was re-
legalized in 1989 and made available after two decades of prohibition, has been 
practiced extensively ever since, especially after first birth. Romanians in 2004 continue 
to have a universal preference for parenting. However, the preference for the two-child 
family has declined and the desire for a larger family has become the exception. The 
transformation of the socialist regime into a democratic society with a market economy 
generated a socio-economic crisis, and the majority of social benefits have therefore 
been oriented towards alleviating poverty. Other social policies, including those 
affecting the family, were redefined. However, fewer funds were made available than 
for those geared to promote economic development or reduce poverty and, as a 
consequence, their impact on childbearing has been small.  
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1. Introduction  
In recent decades, all European countries have experienced a similar development in 
fertility timing and level, namely, childbearing postponement and decreasing fertility. 
The decline of fertility is most pronounced in the former socialist countries. In the early 
21
st century these countries had by far the lowest fertility rates compared to other 
European countries (Council of Europe 2003). Romania experienced a sharp decline of 
fertility after 1990. This is not surprising, as the former socialist regime (1967–1989) 
had applied strong coercive pro-natalist policies to maintain extraordinarily high levels 
of fertility. The fall of that regime in 1989 also spelled the end of socialist family 
policies, and a sharp decrease of fertility followed. At the present time, a typical 
Romanian couple will have one or two children, and the trend is toward single-child 
families. Although most couples desire to have children, only a few decide to have 
more than one. Among the higher birth orders we find the strongest decline. However, 
with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.3 children per woman from 1995 onwards, fertility 
rates seem to have stabilized over the last ten years.  
In postponement of childbearing, the formerly socialist countries (especially 
Romania, Bulgaria, and the countries of the former Soviet Union [FSU]) have the 
lowest mean maternal age at childbirth. Although Romania and other FSU countries 
still have a pattern of early childbearing, the country experienced a moderate but 
continuous increase of maternal age at birth in recent years. Today, Romania is 
characterized by the postponement of first and second births, especially in the most 
fertile age group. At the same time, there are only weak signs that postponed births 
might be recuperated at higher ages.  
Romania’s proportion of non-marital births, although rapidly increasing, is about 
average in Europe. Countries like Estonia or Sweden have the highest rates of non-
marital births (56%), followed by Bulgaria, Denmark, and France; the lowest rates are 
reported by Greece, Italy, and Poland (Council of Europe 2003).   
Romania is one of the countries with the highest abortion rates, after Russia and 
Belarus. In the past, the Soviet Union had proven to be the “initiator” of the “abortion 
culture”. In general, post-socialist countries are among those experiencing the highest 
rates of abortion. However, higher rates are also due to better reporting by individuals 
in these countries. According to Philipov and Dorbritz (2003), the high prevalence of 
abortion is also the result of the high level of unmet need for family planning. They 
argue that women prefer to prevent births rather than to prevent pregnancies. Yet, we 
observe an underlying change in this behavior. Women increasingly tend to use modern 
contraceptives. Consequently, there is a (moderately) growing trend towards the 
substitution of “birth prevention” with “pregnancy prevention.”  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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The aim of this contribution is to provide an overview of recent fertility trends 
(Section 2) and of the proximate determinants of childbearing behavior, such as family 
formation patterns (marriage, cohabitation, and divorce) and the use of contraceptives 
and abortions (Section 3). We describe the role of economic and societal changes, and 
values and attitudes towards the family in Romania (Section 4), followed by a review of 
family policies and their impact on fertility behavior and family formation (Section 5). 
The chapter concludes with a summary and brief discussion of the need for a 
demographic policy in Romania.    
 
 
2. Trends in fertility  
Childbearing is affected by changing demographic patterns of marriage, divorce, and 
cohabitation as well as by rising numbers of non-marital births and changes in family 
planning practices. The current low fertility levels in Western Europe are the result of a 
long, slow and persistent decline since the 1960s. Fertility figures in Romania, 
however, have followed a different path (Table 1). From 1960 to 1966, fertility dropped 
to below the replacement level (less than 2 births per woman since 1964). However, 
from 1967 onwards the socialist regime pursued a brutal pro-natalist policy: The state 
imposed severe restrictions on access to contraception and abortion. As a consequence, 
the decline in fertility rates was abruptly halted (Mureşan 1999) and initially rose 
sharply, even though the total cohort fertility rate, which in Hajnal’s (1947) view is a 
proxy for the actual average family size, declined more slowly. The family size most 
preferred by birth cohorts born after the First World War shifted down towards two 
children. The drop of fertility began in 1990 and rapidly reached levels below 
replacement. However, especially among younger birth cohorts, preference for single-
child families has been steadily growing.  
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1960  352 241  191 521  -16 103  n.a.  219  2.34  26.7 
1961  324 859  162 923  -25 527  n.a.  n.a.  2.18  26.3 
1962  301 985  129 556  -12 160  n.a.  na.  2.04  26.2 
1963  294 886  139 119  -13 571  n.a.  n.a.  2.01  26.1 
1964  287 383  134 907  -30 121  n.a.  n.a.  1.96  26.2 
1965  278 362  114 969  -11 278  n.a.  400  1.91  26.1 
1966  273 678  116 233  -4 521  n.a.  n.a.  1.90  26.0 
1967  527 764  348 635  -1 684  n.a.  n.a.  3.67  26.7 
1968  526 091  337 582  -1 010  n.a.  n.a.  3.64  26.9 
1969  465 764  264 539  -3 614  n.a.  n.a.  3.20  26.8 
1970  427 034  233 779  -12 190  3.5  68  2.90  26.7 
1971  400 146  205 840  -5 090  n.a.  n.a.  2.67  26.5 
1972  389 153  199 360  -7 330  n.a.  n.a.  2.55  26.4 
1973  378 696  175 137  -11 719  n.a.  n.a.  2.44  26.3 
1974  427 732  236 446  -12 368  n.a.  n.a.  2.70  26.2 
1975  418 185  220 647  -8 957  3.5  86  2.60  26.0 
1976  417 353  212 480  -7 290  n.a.  n.a.  2.55  25.9 
1977  423 958  215 273  -13 088  n.a.  n.a.  2.57  25.8 
1978  416 598  204 752  -9 843  n.a.  n.a.  2.52  25.7 
1979  410 603  193 094  -15 866  n.a.  n.a.  2.48  25.5 
1980  398 904  167 028  -17 804  2.8  104  2.43  25.2 
1981  381 101  156 466  -14 114  n.a.  n.a.  2.36  25.3 
1982  344 369  120 249  -17 260  n.a.  n.a.  2.17  25.1 
1983  321 498  87 606  -21 121  n.a.  n.a.  2.07  25.0 
1984  350 741  117 042  -23 388  n.a.  n.a.  2.27  25.2 
1985  358 797  112 127  -20 877  3.7  84  2.31  25.3 
1986  376 896  134 566  -18 132  n.a.  49  2.40  25.5 
1987  383 199  128 913  -20 169  n.a.  48  2.39  25.6 
1988  380 043  126 673  -18 954  n.a.  49  2.31  25.5 
1989  369 544  122 238  -22 364  n.a.  52  2.20  25.3 
1990  314 746  67 660  -86 781  4.0  315  1.84  25.0 
1991  275 275  23 515  -404 397  n.a.  315  1.58  24.5 
1992  260 393  -3 462  -29 397  n.a.  266  1.50  24.4 
1993  249  994 -13  329 -17  177  17.0  234  1.44  24.3 
1994  246  736 -19  365 -16  268  18.3  215  1.41  24.4 
1995  236  640 -35  032 -21  217  19.7  212  1.34  24.6 
1996  231  348 -54  810 -19  473  20.7  197  1.30  24.8 
1997  236  891 -42  424 -13  345  22.2  147  1.32  24.9 
1998  237 297  -31 869  -5 629  23.0  114  1.32  25.1 
1999  234 600  -30 594  -2 516  24.1  111  1.30  25.3 
2000  234 521  -21 299  -3 729  25.5  110  1.31  25.5 
2001  220 368  -39 235  1 029  26.7  116  1.27  25.8 
2002  210 529  -59 137  -1 572  26.7  118  1.26  26.0 
2003  212 459  -54 116  -7 406  28.2  106  1.27  26.2 
2004  216  261 -42  629 -10  095  29.4  88  1.29  26.4 Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Table 1:  (continued)  
 
 
Source: NIS (2001, 2005a, 2005b). For total period fertility rate and total cohort fertility rate series we used CE (2005). For cohort 
mean age at birth we used Ghetău (1997b). 
 
 
Birth cohort  Total Cohort Fertility Rate  Cohort mean age at birth 
1935 2.38  26.8 
1936 2.37  26.8 
1937 2.37  26.8 
1938 2.38  26.7 
1939 2.41  26.7 
1940 2.43  26.5 
1941 2.44  26.3 
1942 2.42  26.1 
1943 2.47  25.9 
1944 2.43  25.7 
1945 2.44  25.6 
1946 2.39  25.4 
1947 2.39  25.3 
1948 2.46  25.2 
1949 2.50  25.1 
1950 2.45  25.1 
1951 2.36  25.2 
1952 2.31  25.2 
1953 2.28  25.1 
1954 2.27  25.1 
1955 2.28  25.0 
1956 2.26  24.9 
1957 2.24  24.8 
1958 2.22  24.7 
1959 2.18  24.6 
1960 2.15  24.5 
1961 2.10  24.4 
1962 2.06  24.3 
1963 2.02  24.2 
1964 1.97  24.1 
1965 1.91  24.2 
1966 1.81  24.3 
1967 1.71  24.4 
1968 1.64  24.6 
1969 1.62  24.8 
1970 1.61  24.9 
1971 1.59  25.0 Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
860   http://www.demographic-research.org 
2.1 Main developments in birth and fertility  
The population of Romania (21.7 million in 2004) has been declining since 1990. This 
development is mainly due to an imbalance between the number of births and the 
number of deaths. In addition, Romania has consistently experienced negative net 
migration. Meanwhile life expectancy increased: by 1997 it reached 67.7 years for men 
and 75.1 years for women.  Table 1 shows the distribution of natural and migratory 
components of population increase, while Figure 1 depicts total births and deaths over 
the period 1961–2004, as well as births by birth order. These data reveal the impact of 
the pro-natalist policies imposed by the socialist regime from 1967 to 1989. After the 
regime collapsed, however, family policies became ineffective for a number of reasons, 
including inflation that caused a decline in the real value of child allowances. 
Moreover, the end of the socialist regime marked the beginning of important changes in 
childbearing behavior. Birth numbers began to fall steeply, stabilizing briefly only in 
1995–2000. Then, the years 2001–2002 brought another decline, followed by a reversal 
in 2003 and 2004. Overall, between 1989 and 2004 the birth rate slumped by 41%. 
From 1992 onwards, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births (Figure 1). As 
regards the deficit of births, we observe that it differs by birth order. Comparing 2004 
data to those of 1989, the highest difference is found among higher-order births (3+); in 
2004 we find 67% fewer higher-order births; 40% fewer second-order births, and 22% 
fewer first-order births. 
 












 Total live-births 
Birth order 2
 
Source: NIS (2001, 2005b). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Immediately after 1989, the total (period) fertility rate (TFR) started to decrease 
dramatically. The average number of births a woman would have in her lifetime 
declined by 1 child, from 2.2 in 1989 to 1.3 in 2004 (Figure 2a), followed by the 
stabilization of the TFR at 1.3 births per woman after 1995. The stabilization was due to 
a change in the age pattern of childbearing rather than less steeply declining rates of 
cohort fertility. Evidence for this development is found in the sinuous evolution of the 
mean age at childbearing and the decrease of total cohort fertility rate. Although the 
latter decrease was not as strong as the decline of the TFR, actual numbers declined 
steadily. First, the mean age at childbearing fell from a maximum of 25.6 years in 1987 
to a minimum of 24.3 years in 1993. From 1993 onwards, Romanian women tended to 
postpone childbirth, and every year the mean age at birth increases by 0.2 years. The 
period and the cohort mean age at birth both have a U-shape (Figure 2b and Table 1).  
The unusual “rejuvenation” in childbearing started in the mid-1980s and lasted 
until 1993. However, it had two episodes: The first was triggered by the pro-natalist 
policy, which pressured young women to anticipate births. The second episode was 
characterized by a continuing decrease in the mean age at birth as a result of declining 
higher-order births. This development continued for another three years after 1989 and 
was mainly due to declining higher-order births, which usually took place at later ages 
under the pro-natalist policy.  
The total fertility rate of second-order births almost halved between 1985 and 1993 
(from 0.73 children per woman in 1985 to 0.38 in 1993) and that of higher-order (three 
or more children) fell even more (from 0.67 children per woman in 1985 to 0.28 in 
1993; see Figure 3a for more details.) Figure 3b shows cohort fertility by birth order 
and confirms that the decline of third and higher-order fertility has been long-lasting 
and persistent. Every cohort born after 1944 made a 1% to 10% lower contribution to 
the total cohort fertility rate of third-order birth than the previous cohort. Second-order 
cohort fertility decreased more slowly than higher-order fertility, whereas first-order 
fertility remained almost unchanged: 85% to 93% of women belonging to the 1944–
1967 birth cohorts experienced a first birth. Although we observe a long-term 
stabilization of the TFR (over the past ten years), it seems that the decline in cohort 




                                                           
5 Using a methodology based on recent developments in Total Cohort Fertility, together with the Cumulated 
Cohort Fertility Rates (on the one side up to age 27, on the other side above age 27), Frejka and Sardon 
(2005) argue that in post-socialist countries (Romania included) the Projected Completed Fertility of the 1975 
birth cohort is closer to the ‘without recuperation’ scenario than it is to the ‘50% recuperation’ scenario, while 
the ‘full recuperation’ scenario is almost impossible to achieve. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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Figure 2a:  Total (period) fertility rate and completed fertility rate lagged by the  






























Source: CE (2005). 
 
 
Figure 2b:  Period mean age at childbearing and cohort mean age at  
  childbearing lagged by the average age at childbearing  
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Source: NIS(2001, 2005b), Gheţău (1997b). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Source: Calculations of the author based on  NIS (2001, 2005b) 
 
 































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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2.1.1 Parenting and family size  
Continuing with a longitudinal perspective, we see that the decision to become a parent 
has become more widespread, whereas the preference for a large family size has 
decreased (see Figure 4, based on census data). Childlessness declined from 15 to 20% 
among birth cohorts born before the Second World War to 10% among those born after 
the war. The proportion of women with one child increased in all birth cohorts except 
those born during the Second World War. Women born in 1921 were the first to adopt 
the two-child model, which has become the most common family size since then. 
However, especially among the younger birth cohorts a new tendency has emerged: an 
increasing number of single-child families (among women born after the Second World 
War) and a slight rise in childlessness (among women born after 1960). Younger birth 
cohorts have not yet completed their reproductive period, and although, theoretically, 
they would be able to recuperate their postponed births, this is very unlikely to happen, 
as cultural norms do not encourage childbirth at later ages. 
 
 































Source: Calculation by the authors based on NIS (1994) for birth cohorts 1915-1954 and on NIS (2003) for birth cohorts 1955-1965. 
 Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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2.1.2 Postponement of childbirth  
As regards the age patterns of fertility, age-specific fertility rates reveal that important 
changes have taken place (Figure 5a). Until 1995, we observe a reduction in fertility 
level among all age groups. Between 1995 and 2000, this reduction affected only 
mothers aged 18–25 (the most fertile ages in Romania). At the same time, fertility rates 
increased at all ages above 25. This trend continued, so that by 2004 fertility patterns 
had changed profoundly: Whereas for many years 21- to 22-year old women tended to 
be the driving force of fertility, now women aged 25 were those with the highest 
fertility rates. To sum up, Romania has definitely begun to experience a trend towards 
postponement of childbirth.  
 
 






































Source: NIS (2001, 2005a). 
 
 
Figures 5b–5d show the analysis by birth order and provide even deeper insights 
into the postponement process. The birth rates by birth order are the so-called incidence 
rates or rates of the second kind, which are computed for all women in a given age 
group and not just for women of certain parity. The first-birth period fertility rates 
(Figure 5b) of the most fertile age group, women aged 20–24, decreased consistently Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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throughout most of the period 1985–2004. A continuous reduction is notable also 
among the youngest age group, women aged 15–19. The fertility reduction of women 
aged 25–29 lasted only until 1990. After that, it continuously reverted. By 1999 it had 
surpassed the fertility of women aged 15–19. After 1995, first-birth period fertility rates 
had started to increase also for women older than 30. 
Second-order fertility rates (Figure 5c) of the 20–24 age group sharply declined. 
The reduction started to lose its pace only in 1991. For women aged 25–29, it came to a 
halt after 1994. In fact, in 1998 for the first time, second-order fertility rates were higher 
among this age group than among younger ones, where the latter showed instead a 
continuous decline. Following a reduction in fertility until 1993, period fertility rates 
have increased constantly for the age group 30–34. In 2004 they reached almost the 
same levels as those reached by women aged 20–24. Thus their fertility was twice as 
high as 10 years earlier. From 2000 onwards, even women older than 35 experienced 
higher second-order fertility. 
As to third- and higher-order period fertility rates (Figure 5d), we observe that 
between 1989 and 1993 they declined among all age groups. In the past ten years, 
however, there have been no major changes in these fertility rates. It seems that women 













































Source: Calculations of the authors based on NIS (2001, 2005b). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Source: Calculations of the authors based on NIS (2001, 2005b). 
 
Figure 5d:  Third and higher-order fertility rates of the second kind by age  







































Source: Calculations of the authors based on NIS (2001, 2005b). Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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2.1.3 Longitudinal (cohort) perspective  
Up to now we have shown a cross-sectional perspective, observing the immediate effect 
of period on fertility age patterns. Behavioral changes, however, are revealed only from 
a longitudinal (cohort) perspective. Several age-parity cohort fertility rates are shown in 
Figures 6a–6f
6. The birth cohorts of 1960 and 1965 completed their family formation 
mainly before the change of regime (in 1990, these women were aged 30 and 25, 
respectively). Their age-specific first-order fertility rates (Figure 6a) are almost 
identical. Differences emerge among women born in 1970. These women have a less 
sharp first-order fertility pattern (in their 20s), and they also differ strongly from 
younger cohorts born after 1975, whose curve has a much flatter shape. Changes in the 
age patterns of second-order births set in from the 1965 birth cohort onwards (Figure 
6b). These women experienced fewer second births in their late 20s than older 
generations. This shift can be attributed to the change in the socio-political regime, 
which now allowed for modern contraceptives and abortion. Women born after 1970 
underwent almost their entire reproductive period under a new political regime. These 
women have evidently postponed second birth (see the less evident peak, which is 
reduced to half in the fertility pattern in Figure 6b), as they tend to realize some of the 
births they postponed in their early years of adulthood. 
However, the metamorphosis of fertility toward later childbearing hardly 
compensates for the postponed births of earlier ages, especially as regards second 
births. Figure 6c displays the cumulative progression rate to first birth. About 90% of 
women born in 1960 experienced the transition to first birth. Taking a look at the 1965 
and 1970 generation, we assume that they will reach this level too. The younger 
generations, however, will need to display higher recovery rates since their cumulated 
progression rate to first birth has been much lower than the corresponding rates of older 
generations. The postponement of second birth among the 1965 generation will 
apparently not be recuperated; fewer than 60% of women of this generation had a 
second child in their late 30s, compared with almost 70% of women from the earlier 
generation (Figure 6d). For those born after 1975, recuperation will even be harder. 
Though these women have enough time for recuperation, one has to consider that the 
delay is substantial and that according to the Romanian culture, births tend to occur at 
an early age.  
Figures 6e and 6f display the differences between cohorts of cumulative 
progression rates to first and second birth, showing more clearly the extent to which 
postponement is widespread. Compared to women born in 1960, recuperation is 
                                                           
6 The figures are based on data from the Observatoire Démographique Européen, and they were given to us 
by Tomas Frejka, one of the editors of the project to which this article is a contribution. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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practically impossible, for first births among the cohorts born after 1970, and for second 
birth among those born after 1960.  
 
 
Figure 6a:  Age-specific fertility rates, first births, birth cohorts 1960, 1965, 1970,  













































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. 
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Figure 6b:  Age-specific fertility rates, second births, birth cohorts 1960, 1965,  














































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. 
 
Figure 6c:  Cumulative progression rate to first birth, birth cohorts 1960, 1965,  





























































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Figure 6d:  Cumulative progression rate to second birth, birth cohorts 1960,  




























































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. 
 
Figure 6e: Cumulative change in first birth progression rate by age, birth cohorts  










































Source: Observatoire Démographique Européenne. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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Figure 6f:  Cumulative change in second birth progression rate by age, birth  













































2.2 Fertility differentials and determinants  
In Romania, surveys enabling the study of the impact of micro-level mechanisms on 
fertility are sparse and rather limited. One exception is the Reproductive Health Survey 
2004 (RHS 2004),
7 in which the sample of 4441 women aged 15–44 allows us to study 
the influence of several proximate determinants on fertility as well as fertility 
differentials between individuals with different characteristics. 
For our analysis we apply life-table analysis as well as proportional hazard 
regression. For the latter we use piecewise constant models, using both first birth and 
second-birth risks as dependent variables. Whereas life-table analysis allows for the 
study of fertility levels and timing differentials by factors, regression analysis enables 
us to measure the relative risks of individuals with different characteristics to 
experience a given event, while controlling for other factors.  
                                                           
7 The Synthetic Report (Ministry of Health 2005) claims a good response rate from the female sample, i.e. 
91.1%. Our own estimates on live birth reporting show that compared to government statistics (from the 
National Institute of Statistics), the numbers of live births are almost identical.   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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2.2.1 Risk patterns for first union, pregnancy, birth, abortion and for second birth  
Figure 7 indicates the hazard rates of first and second-order childbearing. We display 
also the risk patterns of other events such as transition to first union, first pregnancy, 
and first abortion, since they usually tend to have an influence on the birth pattern. All 
rates were estimated on a monthly basis, and represent the behavior of all 4441 
respondents. Women in the RHS reported on every pregnancy they experienced 
throughout their life, regardless of whether pregnancy resulted in a live birth, a 
miscarriage, or an abortion. Since we observe similar patterns regarding first union, 
pregnancy, and birth, we assume that all three events are strongly related to each other 
and they are almost universal. Examining the cumulated percentage of these events, we 
find that 96% of all women experienced a first union, 93% a first pregnancy, and 89% a 
first birth. Women in their 20s face the highest risk of all three events. Second birth-
risks are much lower by contrast: About 64% of all women experienced transition to 
second birth throughout their reproductive lifetime. Figure 7 also shows abortion risks – 
another factor that influences fertility. The abortion curve is flatter: 48% of all women 
had at least one abortion during their reproductive period. 
 
Figure 7:  Occurrence / exposure rates for first union, first pregnancy, first  

















Source: Calculations of the authors based on RHS 2004. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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In the event-history model, we use the following covariates: period, human capital, 
and culture and norm proxies. We also control for union, fertility regulation, birth 
cohort,
8 and for age group. We divide each period into four intervals, corresponding to 
our findings based on macro data analysis. The period before 1990 was characterized by 
the coercive pro-natalistic policies of the socialist regime; the 1990–1994 period 
evidenced a sudden drop in fertility; the 1995–1999 period was marked by the onset of 
structural changes, and the 2000–2004 period by massive structural changes.  
We decided to integrate human capital proxies because in several fertility theories 
they represent an important factor, especially with regard to economic approaches. In 
the analysis of fertility differentials among women with different characteristics, we use 
the level of education, working status, and socio-economic level as a proxy for human 
capital. For our event-history model, however, it is impossible to measure the impact of 
these factors because they were recorded at the time of the interview only. Thus, the 
RHS provides no information on the history of these events. Since these proxies do not 
suit the purpose of a causal analysis when reported as a time-constant variable instead 
of a time-varying one, we had to exclude these factors (see Kravdal 2004).  
The proxies of culture and norms, instead, are considered to be more stable 
throughout life. Thus we use area of residence, religiosity, and region as time-constant 
covariates in our hazard regression models. In the grouping of Romanian regions, we 
apply the NUTS-2 classification, which divides Romania into eight regions (see 
Map 1). These regions were defined only at the end of the 1990s; however, they provide 
an adequate division of the 42 administrative units of Romania. The classification 
accounts not only for ecological differentiation, but also for historical, socio-economic, 
and demographic differences (Sandu 1996, 2000). Cultural differentiations within the 
country are rooted in Romanian history: In 1918 the country was formed
9 from three 
historical regions, called “provincii,” which were mainly under the influence of the 
Ottoman Empire (South, South-West, part of the South-East, Bucharest), the Austro-
Hungarian Empire (North-West, West, and Center), and the Tsarist Russian Empire 
(North-East, part of the South-East).  
 
                                                           
8 The variable birth cohort used in our analysis does not interfere with period and age variables, because it is 
set by other criteria than just the passage of time. The only aim of the three categories of this variable is to 
differentiate the very special so-called ‘forced born’ from the other cohorts born before or after 1964–1974, as 
we describe later in Section 3.3. Although we control for birth cohort, it is not correlated with the five-year 
group period and age variables. 
9 The formation of the country was a long process that started January 1856, ending December 1918. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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2.2.2 Level and timing of first and second births  
Table 2 represents the life-table indicators on the level and timing of first and second 
birth by different factors and the corresponding categories. Analyzing the impact of 
period, again we find that women continuously delay the transition to first birth from 
one period to the next. The increase in the median age at first birth was greatest at the 
transition from the first (“before 1990”) period to the second (1990–1994) period and 
from the third (1995–1999) to the fourth (2000–2004): it was 1.5 years each time. The 
data show that the postponement process became more marked only about five years 
after the change of regime in 1989.  Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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Table 2:  First and second birth level and timing life-table indicators, by  
 categories 
 
  First birth  Second birth 
Factor and category 
Cumulative % 
of those who 







of those who 






Period ***    
before 1990     20.6  965     22.0  467 
1990-1994     22.1  799     24.5  397 
1995-1999     22.8  679     25.2  397 
2000-2004     24.4  541     27.3  378 
Total     21.8  2984     24.5  1639 
Workforce status ***                 
working  88 24.3  2511  55 33.9  1810 
not  working  92 21.6  1930  78 25.5  1174 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
Socio-economic level ***                 
low  93 21.0  1445  80 25.2  1100 
middle  85 23.6  1604  62 30.4  1038 
high 91  25.3  1392  47  .  846 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
Educational level ***                 
no upper  92 20.5  1637  83 24.6  998 
upper  secondary  90 23.5  2257  58 31.2  1700 
post-secondary 81  29.2  547  38  .  286 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
Church attendance                 
at least once a  91 23.2  1712  65 29.2  1148 
less than once a 
month or never  88 23.2  2723  63 29.2  1832 
Total  89 23.2  4435  64 29.2  2980 
Area of residency ***                 
urban  86 24.8  2486  53 35.7  1478 
rural  93 21.6  1955  75 26.5  1506 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
Region ***                 
North-East  91 22.8  718  74 27.8  496 
South-East  86 23.2  585  61 30.2  396 
South  91 22.3  737  63 28.3  529 
South-West  95 21.8  515  69 25.8  397 
West  89 23.1  378  57 29.8  260 
North-West  89 23.3  496  66 30.0  323 
Center  86 24.2  553  63 31.2  348 
Bucharest 84  27.4  459  43  .  235 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
First union ***                  
never in union     20.8  29     24.2  10 
before birth     22.2  2581     24.5  1545 
after birth     19.8  374     21.4  84 
Total     21.8  2984     24.5  1639 Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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Table 2:  (continued)  
 
  First birth  Second birth 
Factor and category 
Cumulative % 
of those who 







of those who 






before  1967  93 22.2  888  70 27.0  823 
1967-1974 (‘forced  89 23.2  1617  59 31.2  1400 
1975  and  after  71 24.3  1936  54 28.8  761 
Total  89 23.2  4441  64 29.2  2984 
First abortion ***                 
never aborted     22.3  1670     24.8  848 
before birth     23.6  277     25.6  360 
after birth     21.0  1016     21.1  46 
Total     21.8  2    24.9  125
 
Source: Calculations of the authors based on RHS 2004 data. 
*** Highly significant, p < 0.001.  
 
 
Women who tend to postpone childbirth and decide less often for children are 
those who are working, have a higher educational degree, and occupy a middle position 
in the socio-economic strata. Religiosity (here measured by church attendance) does not 
have a significant effect on primo-fertility. By contrast, women living in rural areas 
become mothers more often (93% compared to 86% of women in urban areas) and do 
so earlier in life: on average three years earlier than women living in urban areas. 
Significant differences are found regarding the impact of region on fertility. Women 
from the North-East or South-West regions of Romania tend to have first births earlier 
than other women and do so in higher proportions. Bucharest shows the lowest and 
latest primo-fertility. For about 99% of women, being in some form of union is a pre-
condition for having a first child. Since the RHS does not offer information on the form 
of union (marriage vs. cohabitation) we cannot study non-marital births. Nevertheless, 
women who formed their first union after the first birth generally were younger than 
other mothers (by about two and a half years). These very young women, of whom 50% 
were not yet in their 20s, contributed strongly to the increasing trend towards non-
marital birth.
10 
When controlling for the impact of all factors in a regression analysis, a somewhat 
modified picture emerges. Table 3 indicates the relative risks for the transition to first 
and second birth, as well as first abortion.  The period 1990–1994 serves as the basis for 
comparison, as these years witnessed the onset of changes in the fertility pattern. In the 
case of primo-fertility, the significant changes occurred only five years after the change  
                                                           
10 Since the sample size of women who experienced a non-marital birth is too small in the RHS, we were not 
able to perform a differential analysis by ethnic group or religion. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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of the political regime. At that time, first-order fertility dropped significantly—by 14%. 
This decline held for the period 2000–2004. Interestingly, both the periods “before 
1990” and 1990–1994 seem to have had the same effect on the transition to first birth. 
We assume that these results are due to the fact that women of older age groups partly 
compensated for decreasing birth-intensities of younger age groups, and thus we 
controlled for the age-effect in our model. Furthermore, living in rural areas increases 
the risk of first birth by 28% compared to women living in urban areas. Women 
belonging to the North-East, South-West, or the West region of Romania have higher 
risks than women of the Center region. Bucharest continues to have the lowest first-
birth risk, 16% lower than in the Center region. “Being in a union” remains one of the 
best explanatory variables. The highest risk for first birth is during the first or second 
year of union. Compared to women who are in their first two years of union, those who 
are in their third or fourth year of union have a 19% lower risk for first birth; women 
who are in the fifth or sixth year of union have a 48% lower risk; and those who are in 
union for more than seven years have a 69% lower risk. Women not in any union are 
least likely to have a first birth. 
As for the transition to second birth, the life-table indicators reveal that the median 
age of women at second birth increased by 2.5 years between the period “before 1990” 
and 1990–1994, by 0.7 years between 1990–1994 and 1995–1999, and by 2.1 years 
between 1995–1999 and 2000–2004 (Table 2). As shown previously, we found a 
similar pattern for first birth. Human capital proxies show similar differentiations on 
second-birth risks, as is the case for first birth. The highest proportion of transition to 
second birth is found among women who are not working (78% versus 55% among 
working women), who have a relatively low education (83% versus 38% among highly 
educated) and among those who have a relatively low socio-economic position (80% 
versus 47% among women with a high socio-economic status). Interestingly, the 
median age at second birth reaches 34 years among working women and 25.5 years 
among women not working, so the latter experience this transition far earlier. As 
regards the area of residence, women from rural areas more often tend to have a second 
child than women from urban areas. Also here, the transition occurs earlier. Women 
from the North-East or the South-West region are more prone to have a second child 
than women from the Center region of Romania. Again, Bucharest shows the lowest 
rates of transition towards a second birth. Being in a union before second birth (which, 
with 94%, applies to the great majority of women) has a delaying effect compared to 
women who entered first union after this birth. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
http://www.demographic-research.org 879 
Table 3:  Relative risks of first birth, second birth, and first abortion  
 
 First  birth  Second  birth First  abortion 
Factor and category 
Hazard 
Ratio  Sig. 
Hazard 
Ratio  Sig. 
Hazard 
Ratio  Sig. 
Period                   
before  1990  1.00 0.960  1.31 0.002  0.67 0.000 
1990-1994  1 -  1 -  1 - 
1995-1999  0.86 0.010  0.77 0.001  0.78 0.002 
2000-2004  0.80 0.004  0.91 0.375  0.57 0.000 
Church attendance                  
at  least  once  a  month  1 -  1 -  1 - 
less than once a month or never  1.00  0.913  1.06  0.285  1.31  0.000 
Area of residency                   
urban  1 -  1 -  1 - 
rural  1.28 0.000  1.74 0.000  0.91 0.123 
Region                  
North-East  1.18 0.017  1.37 0.001  1.06 0.610 
South-East  1.14 0.075  1.02 0.837  1.76 0.000 
South  1.13 0.075  1.02 0.870  1.22 0.066 
South-West  1.30 0.000  1.31 0.006  2.50 0.000 
West  1.17 0.055  1.08 0.489  1.54 0.000 
North-West  1.14 0.087  0.98 0.856  0.84 0.198 
Center  1 -  1 -  1 - 
Bucharest  0.84 0.043  0.90 0.453  1.97 0.000 
Years since union formation          
no  union  so  far  0.04 0.000  0.13 0.000  0.42 0.000 
during 1st or 2nd year of union  1  -  1  -  1  - 
during 3rd or 4th year of union  0.81  0.000  2.55  0.000  0.84  0.032 
during 5th or 6th year of union  0.52  0.000  1.59  0.000  0.53  0.000 
during 7th and higher year of  0.31 0.000  1.02 0.872  0.40 0.000 
Age group                  
15-19  0.91 0.232  1.09 0.459  0.73 0.006 
20-24  1.20 0.002  1.24 0.003  1.08 0.317 
25-29  1 -  1 -  1 - 
30-34  0.74 0.008  0.63 0.000  0.72 0.004 
35-44  0.27 0.000  0.15 0.000  0.58 0.002 
Years since first birth                  
0-1        0.36  0.000       
2-3        1  -       
4-5        1.51  0.000       
6+        1.01  0.897       
Birth cohort                  
before  1967  1.16 0.012  1.15 0.090  0.83 0.031 
1967-1974  (‘forced  born’)  1 -  1 -  1 - 
1975  and  after  0.99 0.921  0.91 0.307  1.23 0.025 
Event experienced  Abortion exp.  Abortion exp.  Birth exp. 
no  1 -  1 -  1 - 
yes  0.97 0.646  0.86 0.016  3.57 0.000 
   LR chi2(23) = 6476.40  LR chi2(26) = 2514.91  LR chi2(23) = 1272.38 
   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Source: Calculations of the authors based on RHS 2004. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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The regression analysis (Table 3) provides evidence that every period after 1990 
has significantly lower second-birth risks. Compared to the period before 1990, in 
1990–1994 the relative risk for a second birth is 31% lower. And in contrast to the 
period 1990–1994, the risk in bearing a second child in the period 1995–1999 decreased 
by 23%. However, in the 2000–2004 period women had the same risk for a second birth 
as in 1990–1994. Again, we find that religiosity has no significant effect. Regarding 
area of residence, our model reveals that women coming from rural areas have a 74% 
higher propensity to have a larger family than their urban counterparts. This difference 
between urban and rural women is remarkably higher than in the first model, where we 
analyzed the transition to first birth (here, rural women had a 28% higher risk for the 
first birth compared to urban women). As found also for first birth, the North-East and 
the South-West are the most fertile regions. However, when considering second births, 
the differences between the Center region and Bucharest, or the West region, which 
were observed for first-order birth, disappear. Furthermore, the second child does not 
usually arrive very soon after union formation. After giving birth for the first time, 
women tend to wait four to five years to have a second birth.  
 
 
3. Proximate determinants of fertility  
3.1 Marriage patterns, cohabitation, divorce, and separation, 1985–2004  
As in other European societies, the Romanian crude marriage rate decreased during the 
last two decades, declining from 7.1 per 1,000 (7.1‰) in 1985 to 5.9‰ in 2002. In 
2004, however, the country recorded an increase in marriages up to 6.6‰. The total 
female first-marriage rate (below age 50) also fell. Between 1985 and 2002, it 
decreased from 0.89 to 0.66, though rising to 0.74 in 2004. Even today, the Romanian 
marriage pattern is characterized by early transition to marriage, by a relatively high 
level of persons who choose a marital union, by stability (a low divorce rate and a very 
low proportion of higher-order divorce), and by low levels of ultimate celibacy. 
 
 
3.1.1 Marriage patterns  
Between 1985 and 2004, the female mean age at first marriage increased from 21.9 
years to 25.0 years (see Figure 8). We observe a similar development for the mean age 
at first birth: Romania experienced an increase from 22.6 years in 1985 to 24.6 years in 
2004. Despite these recent changes, Romania continues to be characterized by both 
early marriage and early childbirth. The time difference between both events is short, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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indicating that conception precedes marriage. However, these figures are biased, as we 
have to take into account that in recent years the number of births, the proportion of 
never-married persons, as well as the number of non-marital births markedly increased, 
with the latter reaching almost 30% in 2004. On the one hand, these women, who tend 
to be rather young, do not contribute to the mean age at first marriage. On the other 
hand, they contribute to the mean age at first birth (Mureşan and Rotariu 2000). 
Considering the proportion of women who have their first child inside (first) marriage, 
we notice that postponement is indeed taking place – the proportion of women who 
have a child during the first two years of marriage decreased from 61% in 1993 to 46% 
in 2004 (NIS 2005a). The interval between age at first marriage and age at first birth is 
much more pronounced in urban areas than in rural regions (in 2004, 46% of the 
population of Romania lived in rural areas).  
 
 






















Source: CE (2004) for the period 1985-2000 and NIS (2005b) for 2004. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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3.1.2 Cohabitation  
Today, Romania is characterized by a combination of a high proportion of non-marital 
births and a very low level of cohabitation. Non-marital births increased from 4% in 
1985 to almost 30% in 2004 (see Figure 9), whereas the number of persons older than 
15 who were cohabiting was fewer than 5% in 2002 (the first census records of 
cohabitation). Although the level of cohabitation is underestimated, it indicates that in 
Romania cohabitation does not account for modern behavior. Cohabitation is seen as a 
prelude to marriage rather than an alternative to marital union. According to RHS 2004 
data, cohabitation is widespread among women with a lower education (31% of those 
with primary education cohabit compared to 2% of those with a university degree), 
among unemployed women (7% compared to 4% of employed women), among women 
with a lower socio-economic status (11% compared to 2% of those with a high socio-
economic status), and among women from rural areas (7% compared to 4% in urban 
areas). This trend holds for all age groups. As regards ethnicity, 36% of Roma cohabit, 
compared to 4% of Romanians and 11% of Hungarians.
11 The proportion of female 
Roma in the sample is very small (slightly less than 2%); however, these women tend to 
be unemployed. In addition, they usually have a lower educational and socio-economic 
status, independent of their living arrangement (marriage or informal union). 
Our estimates based on the national survey Demography and Lifestyle of 
Romanian Women 2004 
12 indicate that marriage is still more attractive to Romanian 
women than cohabitation. Among women who have a non-resident partner, 42% wish 
to marry within the next two years, compared to 29% who wish to enter cohabitation. 
Cohabitation and childbearing outside the marital context are not seen as an alternative 
to marriage, and the large proportion of non-marital births shows, rather, that there is 
room for improvement in contraceptive education. Modern contraceptive methods 
might have been used insufficiently and inefficiently. Our interpretation is that a high 
number of non-marital births were probably not planned. According to data coming 
from the RHS 2004, the proportion of unintended births among women’s last live birth 
was 27% (11% mistimed and 16% unplanned), i.e., twice as high overall as reported in 
the 1999 RHS (8% mistimed and 4% unplanned). The proportion of unplanned 
pregnancies resulting in abortion declined by 50% between 1999 and 2004, whereas in 
the RHS 1999, 88% of women whose last pregnancy within the past five years ended in 
                                                           
11 The sample is representative of the whole Romanian population above age 18. According to the 2002 
census, the distribution of ethnic groups among the Romanian population is 89.8% Romanian, 6.9% 
Hungarian, 1.8% Roma, and 1.5% other minorities. 
12 The national survey Demography and Lifestyle of Romanian Women 2004 contains information on 1956 
respondents (MMT 2005). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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abortion declared that this pregnancy was unplanned (Şerbănescu et al. 2001), and in 
the RHS 2004, 42% of women in that  situation made the same response.  
 
 












Source: CE (2004) for the period 1985-2000 and NIS (2005b) for 2004. 
 
 
Our estimates based on the national survey Demography and Lifestyle of 
Romanian Women 2004 
13 indicate that marriage is still more attractive to Romanian 
women than cohabitation. Among women who have a non-resident partner, 42% wish 
to marry within the next two years, compared to 29% who wish to enter cohabitation. 
Cohabitation and childbearing outside the marital context are not seen as an alternative 
to marriage, and the large proportion of non-marital births shows, rather, that there is 
room for improvement in contraceptive education. Modern contraceptive methods 
might have been used insufficiently and inefficiently. Our interpretation is that a high 
number of non-marital births were probably not planned. According to data coming 
from the RHS 2004, the proportion of unintended births among women’s last live birth 
                                                           
13 The national survey Demography and Lifestyle of Romanian Women 2004 contains information on 1956 
respondents (MMT 2005). Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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was 27% (11% mistimed and 16% unplanned), i.e., twice as high overall as reported in 
the 1999 RHS (8% mistimed and 4% unplanned). The proportion of unplanned 
pregnancies resulting in abortion declined by 50% between 1999 and 2004, whereas in 
the RHS 1999, 88% of women whose last pregnancy within the past five years ended in 
abortion declared that this pregnancy was unplanned (Şerbănescu et al. 2001), and in 
the RHS 2004, 42% of women in that  situation made the same response.  
 
 
3.1.3 Divorce  
Although since 1989 we have observed changes in marriage patterns, the situation is 
entirely different for divorce. Not only is the (crude) divorce rate low compared to other 
European countries (1.5‰ in 2002), but we also find that the rate has shown no 
tendency to increase since the fall of the socialist regime after which a radical change in 
divorce legislation was introduced. With some minor annual oscillations, the divorce 
rate has stood around 1.5‰ since 1980. In general it is argued that several 
characteristics of Romanian society discourage people from choosing divorce (Rotariu 
2000, 2003). The housing crisis and the general economic situation of Romania make it 
difficult to choose divorce. Moreover, Romanians face higher psychological costs of 
divorce than people in other European countries, as ”not being married” (any longer) is 
considered to be negative by society. Couples living in rural areas have a 2–3 times 
lower divorce rate than couples living in urban areas – the specific way of rural life 
causes several constraints that complicate the decision to  divorce.  
 
 
3.2 Contraception  
Until 1990, the reproductive behavior of Romanian women was characterized by the 
prohibition by the socialist government on the use of modern contraception and family 
planning programs. Induced abortion (although being illegal) and traditional 
contraceptive methods – yet without sex education – were the only possibilities to 
control family size. In 1990, after 23 years of prohibition, abortion was re-legalized and 
family planning programs were established as well. As a consequence, important 
changes in the use of contraceptive methods took place.  
According to the RHS, contraceptive use among women aged 15 to 44 increased 
from 41% in 1993 to 48% in 1999 and reached 58% in 2004. The growth was mainly 
based on an increase in the use of modern contraceptive methods (especially condoms 
and the pill), as seen in Table 4 and Figure 10a. However, the use of traditional methods 
remains high. The same traditions account for the prevalence of people not using any Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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contraception. Both represent a high level of unmet need for family planning. In 1999 
as well as in 2004 we find a similar level of unmet need for modern contraception 
among women who live in a union. According to the RHS 2004 Synthetic Report, this 
level is as high as 40%, one consequence being the high proportion of abortions in 
Romania (Philipov and Dorbritz 2003).  
 
 
Table 4:  Contraception status of women at reproductive age, RHS 1993, 1999,  
 and  2004 
 
   1993 1999 2004 
Modern methods  10.0%  23.3%  33.9% 
Condom 3.0%  7.7%  13.1% 
Pill 2.3%  6.5%  12.7% 
IUD 2.5%  4.9%  4.4% 
Sterilized 1.0%  1.9%  1.8% 
Other   0.5%  2.3%  1.9% 
Traditional methods  30.5%  24.7%  24.2% 
Using no methods  59.5%  51.8%  41.9% 
 
Source: RHS 2004 Synthetic Report. 
 
 
3.3 Induced abortion: impact on fertility decline and influencing factors  
Although we observe decreasing abortion rates, the level of abortion continues to be 
high and characteristic of Romania’s present fertility pattern. The Romanian age 
pyramid is evidence of the impact abortion has had on fertility (Mureşan 1996). In 
1990, when free abortion was re-legalized, there were more than three abortions to one 
live birth. Only in 2004, fourteen years after the re-legalization, did this ratio fall below 
one abortion per live birth.  
We analyzed the reciprocal impact of abortion and fertility between the 1970s and 
the early 2000s. We used RHS data
14 and calculated hazard regression models of first 
birth and first abortion. According to the percentage distribution of both events (Figure 
10b), three groups of women dominate the sample: women who experienced at least 
                                                           
14 The Synthetic Report MH (2005) claims a good response rate from the female sample, i.e. 91.1%. Our 
own estimates on abortion reporting, however, show that compared to government statistics (National 
Institute of Statistics), the annual abortion numbers are underestimated by the survey data. The RHS 2004 
reports 10% fewer abortions. Compared to the RHS 1993, where 19% fewer women report abortion, the 
proportion of underreporting in the RHS 2004 is rather modest. We think that this modest underreporting will 
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one birth, but no abortion; women who experienced at least one abortion; and women 
who neither experienced childbirth nor abortion. The groups are almost the same size. 
This distribution resembles the distribution of women who used traditional 
contraception, modern contraception, and who did not rely on any contraceptive 
methods at the time of interview (Figure 10a). Although these contraceptive practices 
are common among all ages, we suggest that, at least at the beginning of sexual life, 
abortion is seen as a substitute for failed traditional contraceptive methods.  
 
 





















Source: Calculations of the authors based on RHS 2004. 
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Source: Calculations of the authors based on RHS 2004. 
 
 
3.3.1 Impact of abortion on first birth  
Experiencing either first birth or first abortion might induce women to change their 
reproductive behavior and to adopt modern contraception. Consequently, especially at 
the beginning of women’s reproductive phase, abortion might be considered as a proxy 
for fertility regulation. We shall return to that point when reporting results from hazard 
rate regression, a more suitable research instrument that includes covariates such as 
women’s ages. We measure the effect of different socialization conditions among the 
“forced born” birth cohorts (born during the 1967–1974 period) by introducing the birth Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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cohort covariate. These birth cohorts were twice as large as the cohorts before 1967. 
The sudden increase in births in 1967 was due to the strict prohibition of abortion, 
which had been available free until then. As a consequence, this cohort faced over-
crowded kindergartens and schools, an over-subscribed labor market as well as an 
unbalanced marriage market. We expect that this different kind of socialization had a 
negative effect on their fertility. 
Looking again at the differentials in mothers’ median ages at first birth and second 
birth, we take into account their experiences with abortion (see last row of Table 2, the 
“First abortion” factor). Women who had an abortion before first birth (9% of mothers) 
”gained” more than 2.5 years in childlessness compared to women who decided in favor 
of an abortion after birth (34% of the mothers); compared to those women who never 
experienced an abortion, they gained 1.3 years in childlessness (56% of mothers). 
Abortion before second birth results in a postponement effect of 4.5 years on the 
median age at second childbirth, compared to women who chose abortion to regulate 
their fertility after second birth only. Compared to women who never decided for 
abortion, the former gained almost one year. Controlling for all important proximate 
determinants or explanatory factors on fertility (Table 3), we find that an early induced 
abortion (i.e. before any birth) has no significant effect on first birth.  
 
 
3.3.2 Impact of abortion on second birth  
Abortion has a significant impact on second birth: Having experienced an abortion 
reduces the risk by 14%. We interpret this reduction in second-birth risks on fertility as 
a measure of the impact of ex-post birth planning behavior of women. As for the cohort 
effect, we observe a constant postponement process of transition to first birth (see Table 
2): The ”forced born” cohort (1967-1974) gives birth one year later than the previous 
generations (in terms of median ages) and one year earlier than the youngest generation. 
The effect of the “forced born” on second birth is more pronounced, where the median 
age at second birth among this cohort is higher than for both the previous and the 
following cohorts. Compared to the younger birth cohort, women from the “forced 
born” cohort tend to have their second child on average 2.5 years later; compared to the 
oldest cohort, these women give birth 4 years later. However, only differences between 
the “forced born” generation and older cohorts remain significant in the regression 
model (Table 3). In contrast to the oldest cohort, belonging to the “forced born” birth 
cohort decreases the risk of having a first birth by 14%. The risk for having a second 
birth is 15% lower than for the previous birth cohort, though this figure has only weak 
significance.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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In first abortions we distinguish between women who chose abortion after at least 
one childbirth and those did so before any birth. The relative risks estimated by the 
proportional hazard regression model (Table 3, last column) show the effect of birth and 
of other proximate determinants or explanatory factors on first abortion. 
The 1990–1994 period, in which abortion was re-introduced, indicates the greatest 
risk of abortion. Gradually, from one period to the next the risk decreases by about 
20%. Women with frequent church attendance have a significantly lower risk of 
experiencing an abortion (by 31%). Living in a rural area has only a weak influence on 
the abortion risk. The effect of region, however, is very pronounced. The South-West 
(with its maximum relative risk of 2.50), Bucharest (1.97), the South-East (1.76), and 
the West (1.54) have a significantly higher abortion risk than the Center and North-East 
regions. Findings show that abortion in the first two years of first union is very 
common, and is indeed, twice as high as after the fourth anniversary. These results 
confirm our initial hypothesis that abortion works as a substitute for modern 
contraceptives at the beginning of sexual life. Women aged 20–29 have the highest risk 
to decide for abortion. As regards the “forced born” cohort, these women have a 17% 
higher risk to experience abortion than women born earlier. Compared to women who 
belong to the youngest birth cohort, the “forced born” cohort has a 23% lower risk to 
abort. Thus, we find no extraordinary results as regards this birth cohort, as they occupy 
a middle position in an increasing trend towards the use of abortion. However, we find 
that the effect of giving birth on abortion is very high, even higher than the effect of 
abortion on second childbirth. Women who have given birth have a 3.57 times higher 
risk of abortion compared to women who have not yet had a child. Women who have 
had an abortion first have the same risk in giving first birth than women who have not 
experienced abortion, but they have a 14% lower risk of second birth.  
 
 
4. Important societal conditions and their impact on fertility and the 
family  
The metamorphosis of the Romanian fertility pattern and related demographic 
phenomena such as family formation processes took place within a changing socio-
economic context, in transition from a socialist to a democratic political regime. This 
change implied a series of transformations in the most important spheres of life. In this 
section, we briefly describe the transformations that seem to have exerted most 
influence on the context in which individuals live (and consequently on their fertility 
intentions and behavior). So far, Romania lacks studies that provide a thorough 
investigation of the relation between these important societal changes and fertility 
patterns. We assume, however, that the Romanian situation is similar to those described Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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in studies on several other former socialist countries, i.e., with regard to family 
formation and conditions of young people. The economic decline, rising 
unemployment, and falling economic activity rates are also reflected at the individual 
level, where people suffer reductions in household income and living standard. As a 
consequence of these economic constraints, couples might opt for both postponing 
childbirth and limiting the number of children they want to have (Macura 2000).  
 
 
4.1 Economic development  
4.1.1 The socialist regime of Romania  
By the end of the Second World War, Romania was characterized by an agrarian 
economy. Levels of both industrial employment and female labor-market participation 
were low. Between 1930 and 1948 the proportion of people living in rural areas 
declined only marginally, from 79% to 76% (National Institute of Statistics 2001). 
Upon its takeover, the socialist regime pursued a modernization plan that aimed at 
turning the country into an industrial society. All other aspects of political, economic, 
and social life were secondary to this goal. In the first years, the proportion of GDP 
invested in development reached high levels. As a consequence, Romania witnessed the 
formation of a universal health care system and the development of mass education and 
urbanization (based on forced migration from rural areas). In fact, in 1985 the 
distribution of the rural and urban population was more or less balanced. However, the 
means used by the socialist regime were not democratic. Private ownership of the 
means of production was abolished, and the market economy was replaced by a 
centralized, planned economy. We find evidence for this when looking at wage policies, 
where the socialist regime committed itself to the principle of egalitarian revenue. 
Although income varied in different sectors of the economy, differences within one 
sector were small. This policy was not the result of economic considerations, but of the 
ideological assumptions of the regime. Heavy industry, such as the mining and energy 
industry, was seen as the sector most important for the Romanian economy; hence, 
socialist Romania developed an oversized industrial sector, with higher incomes in the 
corresponding occupations. 
We also find evidence for the leading role of industry when looking at the 
educational system. While participation in education increased,
15 the educational 
system itself was mainly designed to supply the requirements of an industrial economy, 
ignoring other aspects of social and economic life.  
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In the following years, Romania witnessed rapid industrialization expressed in the 
creation of single-industry areas and agricultural collectivization. More and more 
peasants became employees. These changes finally led to the demise of the traditional 
rural family and household model.  
The early 1970s are often referred to as “the period of the socialist welfare state.” 
Real income grew constantly during this period, and life expectancy at birth reached a 
maximum of 70 years – a level that was reattained only several decades later. However, 
real income started to decline, slowly but constantly, as a result of inflation. The 
Romanian socialist economic regime was autarkic, as national production supplied 95% 
of the internal market of goods.  
 
 
4.1.2 Economic evolution  
Although in Romania the transition from the socialist regime to a society based on 
democracy and market economy bears similarities to the transitions of other former 
socialist countries, the changes in Romania were unique.  
One major effect the transformation had on the local economy was the steep 
decline of the GDP: Between 1988 and 1992, real GDP declined by 30%. The period 
after 1992 witnessed uneven growth as well as decline (OPPG Ro 2004). Between 1994 
and 1995 the GDP experienced a rebound, which was followed by a period of recession 
(1997–1999). This recession was mainly caused by the onset of structural economic 
changes. Between 2000 and 2005 the development of the GDP was characterized by a 
stable growth of 5% on average, and similar growth is forecast for future years. In 2004 
the European Commission incorporated Romania, according the country the status of a 
“functional market economy,” a status that recognized the advances made by the 
country in areas such as economic stability. Yet, the inflation rate (CPI index) remains a 
constant political and economic concern, and for several years (1992–1994 and 1997), 
the CPI index went into triple digits. It has fallen below 10% only since 2004.  
 
 
4.1.3 Structure of the economy  
In 1989, i.e., at a time when the transformation was still in process, industry accounted 
for about 38% of Gross Value Added (GVA). The industrial sector made up 95% of the 
nation’s export activities and approximately 37% of the labor force. In the same year, 
28% of the labor force belonged to the agricultural sector, accounting for only 17% of 
GVA.  Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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Since 1990 economic development has followed a sinuous path, often described by 
analysts as a period of “boom-and-bust” with major fluctuations in production. 
Although economic policy aimed at reducing the economic deficit (in Romania income 
per capita is about 30% of that in the EU-15 countries), recent political decisions, such 
as on the pace of economic reforms or attitudes towards foreign capital, had rather 
negative effects on the economic development of the country. The proportion of people 
working in the industrial sector has declined constantly since 1990. The same trend 
accounts for the proportion of industry’s GVA to GDP. Compared to heavy industry (a 
male-dominated sector), light industry (a female-dominated sector) in the early 1990s 
witnessed a retrenchment, which until 1996–1997 led to a rise in female unemployment 
rates. Then the phenomenon reversed; heavy industry (mining, metallurgy) was 
downsized and light industry (e.g., the clothes, shoes, and food industry) re-grew. As a 
consequence, unemployment among men increased, whereas unemployment rates for 
women decreased. However, according to economic prognoses, light industry, a 
traditional sector in Romania that propels export and industry output, will also suffer 
from the adverse effects of current economic development (Dăianu 2001; SAR 2005).  
The employment situation in Romania is rather peculiar. Since 1990 the 
agricultural sector, which in Romania is characterized by a high level of employment, 
has been growing constantly. Analysts suggest that the massive re-organization of the 
Romanian economy pushed people who previously worked in the industrial sector into 
the agricultural sector. In this respect, the agricultural sector has become an “employer 
of last resort.” These changes occurred while the sector suffered low levels of 
investment,
16 low levels of productivity and mechanization, and high fragmentation of 
arable land (Dumitru et al. 2004). In general, the agricultural sector consists of rural 
households that own small patches of fertile land, which are cultivated by non-paid 
family members. In most cases, agrarian production is used for private consumption 
only (93% of the agricultural workforce are self-employed and family workers).  
The services sector experienced the most positive development, where the 
proportion of total investment rose from 20% in 1990 to 50% in 2001, and pushed GDP 
growth. Thirty-six percent of the total workforce are employed in the services sector, 
and taken together with the construction sector, these two sectors account for 55% of 
GDP. However, compared to total employment, the proportion of services sector jobs 
remained at the same level.  
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4.1.4 Employment  
At the time of the regime change, about 5% of the workforce was unemployed (Zamfir 
et al. 1994). By 1999 the figure had risen to about 11%, then fell to about 6% in 2004 
(NIS 2005b). The decrease in unemployment figures was more the result of migration 
than of job creation policy or measures. At least two million people – other estimates 
suggest a figure of about four million – left Romania to search for jobs outside the 
country. The Romanian job market is characterized by declining job opportunities and 
steep decreases in real wages.  
Unemployment rates in urban areas are lower compared to rural areas, possibly 
due to the absorption of the workforce into the agricultural sector. This might hide real 
unemployment. At 18% in 2001, unemployment is highest among the younger 
generation, i.e. people aged 15–24 (NIS 1996–2003). High rates are also found among 
those above age 40. People between 25 and 40 years of age are the most active in the 
workforce.  
Although unemployment rates are lower among women (in 2004, 7% of women 
and 9% of men searched for a job), labor-force participation rates by gender reveal that 
women have lower participation rates (52% of all women participate in the labor force 
compared to 64% of men). Yet their rates are rising. In 2004, 20% of the female labor 
force worked as “unpaid family workers” in the agricultural sector. This compares to a 
mere 7% of men. In Romania female employment rates are related to increasing female 
participation in education. Since more women than men attend higher education, these 
women are not available on the labor market. This in part and the number of women 
who are housewives (about 2.5 million according to NIS, 2003) might account for the 
gender differences in the Romanian unemployment rate.  
 
 
4.1.5 Poverty and living standards in Romania  
Both the falling GDP and the restructuring of the economy caused a steep decline in the 
value of household income. By the same token, it led to growing poverty and, most 
importantly, rising uncertainty. The Gini index rose from 0.155 in 1989 to 0.316 in 
1995 and has fallen since then to 0.281. For the assessment of poverty, we used the 
CASPIS/World Bank (2003) program, which develops specific poverty measurement 
tools and indicators. The data show an increase in severe poverty from 6% in 1996 to 
14% in 2000 (and a subsequent decline to 9% in 2003). In 2000, the poverty rate stood 
at 36%, falling to 25% in 2003. The severe poverty rate in 2003 was continually 3.6 
times higher in rural areas than it was in urban areas.  Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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There are significant ethnic differences as well. The risk of the Roma population 
falling under the severe poverty line is three times higher than for the rest of the 
population (77% below the poverty line, while 50% of the Roma population are below 
the severe poverty line). There are also differences at the regional level, with the North-
East region being by far the poorest. The majority of poor people come from 
households where the head of the family has secondary or vocational education. 
Especially in recent years, a higher proportion of persons with vocational education 
experience poverty, mainly due to the lack of job creation.  
Occupation has an important effect on the risk of severe poverty, and we notice a 
higher proportion among people who are self-employed in agriculture (32%), among 
unemployed (24%), and among housewives with children (43%). Families with three or 
more children are among those with a higher proportion of poverty (57% are below the 
poverty line). The youngest Romanian population group (10–24 years old) experiences 
severe poverty more often than pensioners. The poorest 20% of the population consume 
9% of the total consumption, whereas the richest 20% of the population consume 66% 
of Romanians’ total consumption.  
In recent years the rise in GDP has resulted in the reduction of poverty, although 
mostly for urban areas and less so for rural areas (OPPG Ro 2004). These developments 
are related to the fact that rural areas are shaped by the agricultural sector. The rural 
areas also face other difficulties, such as lack of quality housing and of basic facilities 
such as running water and canalization, energy-related deficiencies, an underdeveloped 
infrastructure (including roads, hospitals, and pharmacies), a shortage of doctors and 
nurses, and even underdeveloped trading. 
However, living conditions have improved, especially in recent years. These 
changes also affected the most disadvantaged region (North-East). Additionally, we 
recognize that the high number of people who left Romania in order to find a job have 
also had an impact on poverty development. On the one hand, there might be a lack of 
people due to emigration, since the workforce has subsequently downsized. On the 
other hand, many families benefit from the flow of capital into the country (estimated to 
be around 4 billion Euros in 2005). Furthermore, these people contribute to the 
diffusion of modern values and attitudes, especially in the underdeveloped regions.  
 
 
4.2 Changes in social conditions  
Developing a classification of Eastern European welfare regimes is rather daring and 
does not seem to generate trustworthy results, particularly in Romania (Zamfir 1999). 
The country is shaped by several peculiarities, rooted in its socialist past. Unofficial 
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concern toward poverty issues, and the virtual absence of social assistance are just some 
of the features that marked the socialist era. Certainly, these peculiarities will continue 
to influence the country in the future.  
Today’s Romanian welfare system can be identified as a Bismarckian-type of 
welfare state (corporatist-continental), as we find several of the standard “social 
contingencies.” In 1997 the universal health care system was abolished and transformed 
into a system of health insurance (the change took until 1999). Furthermore, in 1991 
compulsory unemployment benefits were introduced, and the pension system was 
transformed by freeing it from ideological principles. The introduction of means-tested 
benefits such as social assistance and the majority of family benefits (i.e., 
supplementary allowance, single parent allowance, and the minimum guaranteed 
income etc.) are the result of attempts by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Deacon and Hulse 1997; Deacon 2000). Both institutions influenced 
the Romanian political regimes from 1992 onwards. However, in terms of the level of 
social provision and its marginal effect on preventing and containing poverty, Romania 
can be described as a “residual” welfare state. Universal aspects of benefits are of 
marginal importance in the country, pertaining mainly to child-related support, which is 
at a negligible level.  
 
 
4.3 Values and attitudes toward the family  
Voicu (2001) argues that Romanians tend to have both traditional and modern value 
orientations. Given the contact with Western European countries, Romanians have 
started to adopt Western values and to imitate modern and post-modern behavior. At the 
same time, however, material insecurity enhances the importance of traditional values 
and favors conservative behavior. Voicu interprets this change in behavior as a way to 
counter the existential risk that emerged after the fall of the socialist regime. 
Even today, religion still continues to be one of the most powerful and persistent 
characteristics of Romanian society. According to national survey data (Open Society 
2005),
17 high proportions of Romanians believe in the ability of the Church to offer 
solutions to problems of everyday life. Sixty-two percent of the population state that the 
church provides the right answers to family life issues, and 70% to 80% state that the 
Church addresses people’s spiritual needs and moral issues. Moreover, a high 
proportion of Romanians (39%) regards the Church as provider for right answers to the 
social problems of the country.  
                                                           
17 The Public Opinion Barometer Survey was conducted by the Open Society Foundation in November 2005 
and is representative on a national level. The survey is accessible at http://www.osf.ro. Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
896   http://www.demographic-research.org 
In view of the important role of religion within the country and the turn towards 
traditional attitudes and behaviors, it is not surprising that family and children play a 
major role in the lives of Romanian people. Marriage is still considered as an important 
step in life and not as an outdated institution.  
Rotariu (2006) found that Romanians tend to regard childbearing as both a moral 
duty (94%) and a means of personal fulfillment (85%). About 93% of Romanian 
women declared they prefer the classical model of a two-parent family. In contrast, 
59% of women stated that it is acceptable for a woman to remain unmarried and to have 
a child. Based on these results, Rotariu argues that Romanian women appreciate the 
traditional family as the proper environment in which to raise children. However, they 
also show tolerance for single mothers. Rotariu found similar results when analyzing 
women’s attitudes towards marriage. Whereas 85% of women do not consider marriage 
an outdated institution, about 40% see advantages of cohabitation over marriage (such 
as personal freedom, happiness, and having different friendships). Yet, Rotariu assumes 
that the positive attitude towards cohabitation does not result in a change of family 
formation behavior, but rather represents tolerance of women for various situations in 
life.  
Notwithstanding, younger and better-educated women living in (large) urban areas 
and having a high income are in less agreement with these statements. These women 
tend to have less traditional attitudes regarding family. Thus, a change in value 
orientations applies only to a limited number of people. These women tend to have 
more possibilities of contact with western countries, and due to higher income they also 
experience less economic uncertainty. Both factors allow them to focus on higher-order 
needs (MMT 2005). However, as regards the larger part of the Romanian population, 
their life course is strongly shaped by high levels of economic uncertainty. This applies 
also to the decision to have one or more children. Using the national survey 
Demography and Lifestyle of Romanian Women 2004, which contains information on 
value orientations of women and characteristics of their partners, we found that 
although children and family are highly important for Romanian women, more and 
more couples tend to want only one child. Whereas the vast majority of childless 
women wish to have a child (91%), only 8% do not intend to give birth at all (the 
remaining women are undecided). As for women who are already mothers, we found 
that just 37% desire another child, whereas merely 7% of women with two or more 
children intend to have another birth.  
Among childless women, we observe a strong impact of economic factors on 
childbirth intentions. While being employed increases the intention to have a first child, 
the occupational status of the partner has an impact, too, as an unemployed partner 
weakens the intention to have a child. Furthermore, being religious and considering 
children as a precondition for happiness increases the intention of becoming a mother, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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while increasing age (over 35) reduces the intention. As for the time horizon where 
women desire childbirth, married women have the strongest intention to become 
mothers within the following two years. Interestingly, although employment increases 
the intention for childbirth, a high socio-economic status decreases this intention. We 
argue that this is due to a stronger focus on self-realization and the higher opportunity 
costs of childbirth among these women.   
Regarding childbirth intentions of women who are already mothers, we found that 
the existence of more than one child strongly reduces the intention to have another 
birth. As much as employment seems to have no effect on the intention of these women, 
the lack of an income earner has a strong negative impact on further childbirth 
intentions. Women who believe that it is the parents’ duty to afford their children the 
best possible life (even when daring to face poorer living conditions oneself) are 
especially prone to extending their family. Additionally, we found that women from 
rural areas tend to have stronger intentions to have another birth than women living in 
urban areas.  
To sum up, family and children are still important aspects in the life of Romanian 
women, where most women desire to have at least one child. However, few women 
intend to have more than one birth. However, economic resources provided  by stable 
employment enhance the desire for a (another) child in the near future. 
 
 
5. Family policies and their impact on fertility behavior and family 
formation  
Under the socialist regime, the family was seen as the “basic cell of society”. In order to 
impose this philosophy on the Romanian population, the regime reverted to specific 
economic and non-economic incentives. On the one hand, unmarried people over age 
25, for instance, had to pay higher taxes, while on the other hand, married people 
benefited from tax reductions. In addition, access to different services was controlled, 
among them access to housing.  
Most analysts argue that under the influence of “homebred ideologies and to some 
extent of the World Bank” (Ferge and Juhasz 2004: 233), former socialist countries 
developed rather restrictive family policies (Sipos and Toth 1998; Macura 2000; Forster 
and Toth 2001).  
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5.1 Family benefits  
Family benefits have only an indirect influence on fertility (Gheţău 1997a), inasmuch as 
they aim at reducing the economic costs of children and do not necessarily promote 
higher fertility rates. When comparing current family benefits with those of the socialist 
regime (where they used to be connected to income), we observe a drastic reduction in 
their real value. Taking into account that Romania witnessed increased cost of living, 
the current family benefits fail to reduce the direct costs of children.  
In 2007, Romania provided the following family benefits:  
Child allowances are universal. Until the child is aged 18, parents receive a small 
amount of 25 RON per month (1 Euro equals  approximately 3.5 RON). 
Universal benefits for pre-school and primary school children (one cold meal per 
day of 1 RON). 
Complementary allowances are paid on a means-tested basis. Families with an 
income below 176 RON per family member receive a monthly amount of 36 RON if 
they have one child; up to 52 RON for four or more children.  
Single-parent family allowances are means-tested. Single parents with a monthly 
income below 176 RON per family member receive 52 RON monthly if they have one 
child; up to 79 RON monthly if they have four or more children.  
Other benefits provide support in special financial emergencies, such as accidents 
or natural disasters.  
 
 
5.2 Maternity leave and childcare  
The Romanian socialist regime, unlike other socialist regimes, did not make provisions 
for childcare leave, although it offered maternity leave. During socialist times, 
Romanian mothers had the option to take 112 days maternity leave. During this leave 
they received between 55% and 85% of their previous salary; however, the amount 
depended upon work experience. After the third childbirth, mothers received 94% of 
their previous income. Moreover, applications for paid leave in order to care for sick 
children were possible only for children below age three (Popescu 2004). Childcare 
leave was introduced in Romania as recently as 1990 and applied to employed mothers 
only. The amount of support represents 65% of the salary women earned when making 
the application. In 1997, new legislation changed the conditions for paid childcare 
leave. It gave mothers employed for at least six months before birth the right to take 
paid leave up to two years. They received about 85% of the salary they earned in the six 
months preceding birth. Two years later, in 1999, paternity leave was introduced, and 
although optional, it consists of a five-day leave with a wage compensation of 100%. In Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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2000, a new act provided maternity leave for up to 126 days. Economic benefits were 
fixed at 85% of the mean wages of the last 6 months.  
Similar financial limits were assigned to childcare leave. Three years later, in 
2003, a legislative act paved the way for an “optional insurance”. This law allowed for 
substantially increasing childcare benefits for mothers who signed an “insurance 
contract”, yet, only five weeks later, this law was superceded by another act. On 31 
December 2003, childcare leave stood at 85% of the average gross national wage. In 
January 2006, the latest changes were made. The right to childcare leave was restricted 
to people who were employed for at least 12 months before birth. From then on, 
benefits were paid on a flat rate of 800 RON. In addition, the government introduced a 
premium of 300 RON for mothers who return to work. The same act, however, consists 
of modifications, effective in 2007, that include the following: Childcare benefits 
decreased to 600 RON monthly; the premium for mothers returning to employment 
were reduced to 100 RON; child allowances increased (to 200 RON monthly for 
children below age two; for all children above that age, child allowances remained at 
the previous rate of 25 RON monthly). Since 2001, women receive a premium when 
delivering a child (204 RON). This applies to the first four children. 
Looking at the evolution of childcare provision, the introduction of paid childcare 
leave in January 1990 was a reaction to the lack of such provision in socialist regime 
times. The increase in the length of childcare leave by another year (two years in total), 
introduced in 1997, is more a measure aimed at decreasing female unemployment than 
at increasing the attractiveness of motherhood. The same intent pertains to anticipatory 
retirement as well. Another important modification is the extent of these regulations; 
whereas previously they applied up to the first four children, these regulations now 
applied only to the first three children. This reduction recognized that the attempt to 
promote larger families was futile. In addition, politicians recognized that family 
policies had a sparse impact on certain social groups, who in any case tend to have a 
higher number of children. Unfortunately, this measure discriminated against some 
ethnic groups such as the Roma population, who are prone to have larger families.  
Almost all regulations implemented after 2000 advantaged women with smaller 
income and disadvantaged women with higher income, as they were based on fixed 
amounts of money and were not income-related. Furthermore, the above-cited changes 
in the amount of provision (from 85% of the average gross national wage to a flat-rate 
sum) contribute to increasing opportunity costs of childcare leave and childbirth in 
general, as the flat rate is not connected to inflation. Without further modifications, 
within a few years the rate will not suffice to cover living costs. Data show that in 
December 2003, approximately 25% of all employed women had an income that 
surpassed the amount provided by childcare benefits.  Mureşan et al.: Romania: Childbearing metamorphosis within a changing context 
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With respect to childcare services, the former socialist regime established daycare 
centers (crèches for children below age two, kindergartens, and kindergartens with 
extended opening hours), yet the number and the quality of the centers did not satisfy 
the need. The introduction of childcare leave in 1990 and its subsequent expansion to 
two years from 1997 onwards contributed to the decreasing importance of crèches. In 
fact, the number of crèches and their coverage is rather small, while kindergartens are 
most widespread in urban areas and less so in rural regions. In 2002, about 70% of all 
children aged 3 to 6 years attended pre-school. Most institutions that take care of these 
children have long opening hours (from 8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m.). The fees parents have 
to pay for these services are limited and amount to about 1 Euro per day for food. 
Private childcare services have emerged, too, owing to the lack of public provision, yet 
for the majority of the Romanian population, the costs (from 100 to 500 Euros per 
month) are prohibitive.  
 
 
5.3 Housing  
Problems in the housing market intensified, especially in the final years of the socialist 
regime. The number of dwellings built between 1986 and 1989 was approximately 50% 
of the number built between 1980 and 1985 (Popescu 2004). At the beginning of the 
1990s the public stock of dwellings was privatized, with the construction of new 
housing rising strongly only in recent years. Private investments take on more 
importance here than public provision. Recently, the housing market has oriented itself 
towards high-income families and has thereby pushed up the cost of dwellings. In this 
way housing problems contribute to the increasing uncertainty of young people and 
complicate decisions on family formation. 
 
 
6. Discussion  
After the fall of the socialist regime in 1989, the coercive population policy, which had 
dominated fertility development in Romania until then, was one of the first regulations 
abolished by the new government. Since then, fertility has undergone two important 
changes: a sharp reduction in the level of fertility, followed by structural changes. 
These changes consist of childbirth postponement, an end to the prevailing universal 
fertility pattern, and a steep rise in non-marital births. Today, contraception and 
abortion, which were re-legalized after the regime change and are affordable for all 
strata of the Romanian population, are increasingly used and accepted among couples to 
control fertility. Although abortion still tends to be used as a measure to prevent birth Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 23 
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(especially after first childbirth), it is being gradually replaced by the use of modern 
contraception. Data for 2004 reveal that the desire for children is still widespread; 
however, preferences for a two-child family have decreased and only a few women 
declare the desire for a large family.  
Bearing in mind that Romania experienced decades of “pro-birth” policies, it has 
become difficult to address the newly emerging issue of low fertility by new population 
policies. As Trebici (1997) states, inhuman methods with dramatic consequences for 
individuals and families must be rejected. They should be replaced instead by policies 
based on the rights of individuals. Still, there is need for a population policy that assists 
couples to achieve the number of children they desire. Trebici (1997) argues, “If 
couples have the right to decide for childlessness, then it is an obligation for the 
government to support families who want children.” 
The transformation of the socialist regime towards a country with a market 
economy caused both an economic and a societal crisis. Obviously, the majority of 
social benefits are aimed at alleviating poverty. In Romania the economic decline 
caused a reduction in government revenues and spending. Consequently, funds for 
social policy that are not oriented towards poverty reduction or economic development 
are scarce.  
The need for a demographic policy is widely discussed among Romanian analysts 
and policy makers. Gheţău (1997a) stresses that Romanians should have children 
because they desire to have them, and not because they are compelled to give birth, as 
was the case under the socialist regime. Zamfir (Urse, 2001) picks up on this idea and 
argues that policy should aim at developing a certain degree of social security for 
children and thus at minimizing the risk of experiencing poverty. Furthermore, he 
assumes that in the current situation, population policies that are targeted at recovering 
fertility decline will influence only the most disadvantaged segments of the population. 
In fact, the major goal should be to improve the material conditions of the whole 
society, as this would lead to increasing fertility rates of the middle class. According to 
Rotariu (Urse, 2001), the improvement of the economic situation in itself does not lead 
to demographic change. He suggests that policies oriented towards the reduction of 
poverty are by far insufficient to reverse the fertility trend of the last years. In this 
context, we argue that future policy should aim at improving the living conditions of 
individuals and thus the social context in which Romanians take fertility decisions. The 
value of parenthood should be emphasized, and opportunity costs for children must be 
reduced. In addition, policy should contribute to achieve a certain level of work–life 
balance. The reconciliation of family life and professional life is a large challenge to 
future policy in Romania.  
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